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This study presents data from a community survey of Oklahoma City which suggests that
the putative tax rebellion is neither as massive nor as homogeneous as some observers
contend. The data support Buchanan’s contention that the widespread support for tax
reduction has occurred because the costs, defined in terms of potential cutbacks in
government expenditures, are not specified in the proposed legislation. In addition, the
findings suggest that people vary in what costs they are willing to incur in order to lower
taxes. Some people support tax reduction out of a desire to limit welfare spending and
others out of a desire to reduce spending on collective goods. We suggest that the former
represents a traditional, conservative response to liberal welfare legislation. However, we
identify the latter as a new interest group in American politics which cross-cuts traditional
lines of cleavage.
Some observers have interpreted the rash of legislative attempts
across the country to reduce taxes as the beginning of a tax
rebellion of &dquo;massive&dquo; proportions (Field, 1978; &dquo;The revolt’s
deeper roots,&dquo; 1978; Musgrave, 1979). A less optimistic appraisal
of the movement has been offered by Buchanan (1979) who
contends that the widespread support for tax reduction proposals
occurs largely because the costs of tax reduction, defined in terms
of potential cutbacks in government expenditures, are not speci-
fied in proposed legislation. Two consequences may be antici-
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pated when, or if, voters are presented with a tax reduction
package which also specifies corresponding reductions in govern-
ment expenditures resulting from the tax cut. One, many people
who believe their taxes are too high nevertheless will be unwilling
to support tax reduction. Two, people will vary in what costs they
are willing to incur in order to lower taxes. The former portends
erosion of support for the movement as costs are pitted against
gains. The latter suggests a focal point of factionalism within the
movement. In this article, we examine these issues using prelimi-
nary data from a community survey of a major southwestern
metropolitan area (Oklahoma City).
THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE &dquo;FREE-RIDER&dquo; PRINCIPLE
Buchanan ( 1979) advanced the &dquo;free-rider&dquo; principle as a basic
explanation for the success of Proposition 13 in California. The
free-rider principle asserts that, &dquo;if the benefits of an action are
concentrated and well-defined while the costs are diffused and
generalized, we can predict the individuals ... act without due
regard to the costs involved&dquo; (Buchanan, 1979: 692). Buchanan
suggests that the proponents of Proposition 13 offered the well-
defined benefit of a specific reduction in property taxes, while
opponents failed to provide voters with persuasive estimates of
exactly what government expenditures would be reduced and the
extent to which they would be reduced. Not surprisingly, then, the
voters overwhelmingly endorsed the referendum.’ I
Since tax revenue is a function of both the tax rate and the tax
base, a tax reduction does not necessarily incur a loss of tax
revenue and hence of public services. However, many voters and
authors of bills seek a level of tax reduction which, in the absence
of some change in the tax base, should reduce tax revenue. In
spite of this, legislative attempts to lower taxes generally have not
included formal assessments of impact on tax revenue or of
projected budgetary restrictions which would be enacted to offset
revenue losses should they occur. However, if a tax reduction bill
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did forecast subsequent cutbacks in government services and
programs and these prospectives cutbacks were clearly and con-
vincingly defined, the converse of the free-rider principle implies
that there would be much less inclination to favor passage pro
forma. Hence, a sterner test of a tax &dquo;rebellion’s&dquo; mettle would
occur if voters were confronted with some possible costs of
reduced taxation defined in terms of reductions in government
expenditures. Data from our project concerning perceived tax
burdens and projections about what one is willing to sacrifice in
order to reduce taxes bear directly on this aspect of Buchanan’s
argument. When cutbacks in particular government expenditures
are specified as a consequence of a tax cut, we suspect that the
percentage favoring tax reduction will be noticeably less than the
percentage who feel they are taxed excessively.
DIMENSIONS OF THE TAX REBELLION
As noted above, the free-rider principle leads us to anticipate
that enthusiasm for tax reduction will diminish when a proposed
tax cut is linked with reductions in specific expenditures. This
raises the possibility that the tax rebellion is a heterogeneous
movement containing latent factionalism. In the absence of con-
sensus about exactly what cutbacks are appropriate, public sup-
port for tax reduction may appear extensive and unified because
those willing to reduce government expenditures for one kind of
program are coincidentally allied, via the free-rider principle,
with those willing to reduce another kind of government expendi-
ture. If it is necessary to reduce expenditures in order to lower
taxes, the heterogeneity of the movement should become readily
apparent.
Opinion polls suggest there are at least two categories of con-
cern manifested in the current tax rebellion (Field, 1978; Ladd,
1978a). One source of support for tax reduction seems motivated
by antagonism toward government spending on social welfare
programs of low-income citizens. A Gallup poll conducted for
Newsweek and a CBS News/ New York Times poll, both using
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national probability samples, reveal that, to a greater extent than
for any other government expenditures, respondents feel that too
much tax money is spent for social services such as welfare
programs (Ladd, 1978a: 33). Time (see &dquo;The revolt’s deeper
roots,&dquo; 1978: 59) magazine pollster Daniel Yankelovich argues
that many people believe that the use of tax money to assist
specific categories of people &dquo;in need&dquo; is a basic &dquo;unfairness&dquo; in
American life. Since thece opinions seem to reflect basic Ameri-
can conservatism, we suspect that the tax rebellion is to some
extent a response to liberal welfare legislation. This is hardly new
in American politics, reflecting the traditional split between
Democrats and Republicans over the issue of the welfare state.
In the polls described above, many people believe that govern-
ment expenditures on other types of programs, besides welfare-
related programs, are excessive. Substantial proportions of
respondents in these polls say that too much is spent on public
services such as parks and recreation programs, road repair and
maintenance, police protection, and so on. A National Opinion
Research Center poll also reveals that a large number of respond-
ents believe too much is spent for national defense (Ladd, 1978a:
32). These kinds of expenditures commonly are referred to as
&dquo;collective goods&dquo; (Olson, 1965; Buchanan, 1968). A collective
good is simply a service &dquo;made available for consumption by all
members of a group&dquo; (Smith, 1976: 292). This type of expenditure
is in marked contrast to welfare programs aimed at benefiting a
particular segment of the population.2
We suspect that those people willing to support tax reduction
at the expense of cutbacks in welfare spending aimed at benefiting
low-income groups are not the same people as those willing to
support tax reduction at the expense of cutbacks in expenditures
for collective goods. In other words, we hypothesize that there are
two dimensions to the current tax revolt. Some people support
tax reduction out of a willingness or desire to reduce welfare
spending; others support tax reduction out of a willingness or
desire to reduce spending on collective goods. The latter group,
we believe, is a new interest group in American politics which
cross-cuts traditional lines of party and socioeconomic cleavage.
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It is this group which qualifies as an incipient social movement if a
social movement is defined as an emergent interest group (Gam-
son, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
DATA
Data were gathered in the spring of 1979 as part of an annual
survey of Oklahoma City and its surrounding suburbs. The sam-
ple of 401 respondents, drawn randomly from the Polk Directory,
taps the metropolitan adult population. This sampling procedure
generated a sample very similar to the population of the commun-
ity in selected demographic characteristics (U. S. Bureau of Cen-
sus, 1970). Of the sample, 85% compared to 87% of the popu-
lation are white; 44% of the sample and 45% of the population
are males. The median age of the sample is 45 years, while the
median age of the adult population is 42.
The initial presentation of data concerns the respondents’ per-
ceived tax burden and the correspondence between these percep-
tions and traditional lines of party and socioeconomic cleavage.
The political party variable was measured by asking respondents
to classify themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or &dquo;Independ-
ents.&dquo; Annual family income is selected as the prime attribute of
socioeconomic status since it, more than occupation or educa-
tion, is directly linked to the amount one pays in taxes. As a
measure of each respondent’s perceived tax burden, the following
question was asked:
As you know, we all pay different amounts of federal, state, and
local tax depending upon how much money we make and the tax
deductions we qualify for. Do you think that you currently have to
pay too little, about the right amount, or too much tax?
Percentages of those who say they are taxed excessively, and
the frequency distributions from which they are drawn, are pres-
ented in Table 1.3 Almost two-thirds of our sample (63.3%) think
they now have to pay too much in taxes. Variation across party
lines in the proportion who think they are taxed excessively-
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TABLE 1
Respondents’ Assessment of Amount Paid in Taxes
a. F = 1.86, df = 2, 397, p > .05.
b. F = 2.46, df = 4, 395, P < .05.
69.0% for Democrats, 68.7% for Republicans, and 68.0% for
Independents-is not statistically significant as indicated by the F
test in the table. Income groups, however, are another matter.
The proportion of malcontents rises steadily from about one half
(52.4%) in the lowest quintile to approximately three-fourths
(71.1 %) in the two highest quintiles. These overall differences,
judged by an F test, are significant.
The free-rider principle leads us to anticipate that not all those
dissatisified with the amount they pay in taxes will favor tax
reduction when confronted with cutbacks in specific expendi-
tures.4 As measures of willingness to support reduced taxes at the
expense of social welfare programs, we presented the following
items, each with a five-point agree/disagree response format:
I would support tax bills which lower the amount I pay in taxes
even if it meant less money were spent on:
(1) welfare programs
(2) improving our prisons
(3) public housing for the poor
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TABLE 2
Support for Reduced Taxes at Expense of Specific Programs
*p < .05, df = 1
a. Asterisks refer to X2 test of difference between percent who say they are taxed
excessively (63.3%) and percent support for lower taxes even if less were spent on
specific program.
b. Total sample size = 401. Level of support for lower taxes at the expense of a spe-
cific program is derived for this table by counting the number of respondents who
either &dquo;agree&dquo; or &dquo;strongly agree&dquo; with corresponding item.
The same items were presented concerning police protection for
the community, national defense, and street/ highway construc-
tion and repair as measures of willingness to sacrifice collective
goods in order to reduce taxes.
A list of dichotomized responses to these items is presented in
Table 2. These data basically confirm our expectation that many
people who think their taxes are too high nonetheless are unwill
ing to support tax reduction when a tax cut is linked with
reductions in government expenditures. If cutbacks in expendi-
tures have to be made in order to lower taxes, welfare programs
head the &dquo;hit list,&dquo; followed by reductions in money spent for
prisons, highway/ street construction and repair, public housing,
national defense, and police protection. Only the percent favoring
a reduction in welfare spending to reduce taxes (66.1 %) corres-
ponds to the proportion who claim an excessive tax burden
(63.1 %). Levels of support for all other cutbacks are significantly
smaller than the percent who claim to be taxed excessively. These
findings support Buchanan’s (1979) argument concerning the
salience of the free-rider principle in mobilizing support for tax
referenda.
To what extent are the proportions favoring cutbacks in expen-
ditures made up of the same persons as we shift our focus from
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TABLE 3
Factor Analyses of Tax Reduction Items
a.tcc =.06a. 1’2 2 .0
b. rFIF2 00b. rF 1 F 2
.00
one type of program to the next? This question may be answered
by factor analyzing the tax reduction items. If essentially the same
nucleus of persons prefers to see taxes reduced regardless of the
expenditures at stake, then only one factor will emerge in an
analysis of the items. However, if persons willing to sacrifice
social welfare and collective good programs are distinct from
each other, then two factors will be detected in such an analysis.
Results of the factor analyses are summarized in Table 3. Two
of the total of six factors have eigenvalues greater than 1.0, a
common criterion for judging the significance of a factor. Fur
thermore, following the guideline of the &dquo;scree test&dquo; where the
number of significant factors equals the number of factors before
the greatest &dquo;break&dquo; in a plot of factors and eigenvalues-1.88,
1.45 / .83, .74, .53-we must conclude that there are not one but
two underlying factors (Gorsuch, 1974). This suggests that there
are two different concerns giving rise to support for tax reduction
among respondents in this sample.
Examination of the factor loadings provides the basis for
assessing and naming the factors. A varimax rotation for a two-
factor model assumes uncorrelated factors in deriving a solution,
while an oblique rotation allows for the possibility that factors are
related. As indicated in Table 3, we performed both types of
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rotation. In both cases, welfare, prison, and public housing items
load highly on Factor I, but not on Factor II, and the street/
highway, national defense, and police protection items are corre-
lated highly with Factor II but not Factor I. The correlation
between the two factors for the oblique solution is practically zero
(r flf2 .06) and, as a result, loadings calculated for the two
procedures are basically the same.5 All this may be taken to mean
that one category of respondents favors tax reduction at the
expense of social welfare programs but disagrees about cutting
collective good programs to lower taxes, while another grouping
of respondents is willing to restrict collective good expenditures
in order to lower taxes but lacks consensus about whether it is
appropriate to restrict social welfare programs for that purpose.6
Our next concern is the political party and income characteris-
tics of these categories favoring tax reduction, each at the expense
of a different kind of program. An assessment of these character-
istics may clarify whether the tax rebellion represents the squar-
ing off of new political groups or simply is a new version of
established lines of cleavage in American politics. This can be
accomplished by scaling the items tapping support for tax reduc-
tion at the expense of each kind of program and analyzing these
support levels by political party preference and income character-
istics.7
A summary of findings derived from a covariance analysis is
presented in Table 4.8 Two F ratios are computed for each type of
program. The first tests the null hypothesis that the average
relationship between income and support for tax reduction in
the three party preference categories is not zero. The estimate of
this common slope is the average within-party regression coeffi-
cient (bw) derived from the regressions of support for tax reduc-
tion on income computed for each party preference category. A
significant F ratio gives evidence that bw is nonzero, in this case
indicating disagreement among higher and lower income persons
about whether expenditures ought to be cut in the designated type
of program. The second F tests the null hypothesis that the
willingness to sacrifice the type of program involved, when &dquo;puri-
fied&dquo; of its relationship with income, will be equally high (or low)
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TABLE 4
Covariance Analysis of Support for Tax Reduction at the Expense
of Social Welfare and Collective Good Programs
*p<.05
a. bw is the average within-party (unstandardized) regression coefficient.
among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. A significant
F ratio means that one or two of the political groups are more
willing than the other(s) to sacrifice the program concerned in
order to lower taxes.
There are significant income differences in support for tax
reduction at the expense of social welfare programs (F = 5.57,
p < .05). As income increases, there is a greater willingness to
restrict social welfare programs in order to lower taxes (bw = .12).
This is not true for collective good programs (F = .18 and bw =
.01). Thus, the preference for cutbacks in collective good expendi-
tures as a way of lowering taxes is not a linear function of annual
family income.
Political party preference is related to support for tax reduc-
tion for both types of expenditure reductions. The F ratio of 9.66
for the social welfare dimension and of 7.47 for the collective
good dimension are both statistically significant. By themselves,
however, these F ratios do not indicate which categories of party
preference are high and low on the two dimensions. The tech-
nique of orthogonal comparisons can indicate which differences
among political party categories are significant for both dimen-
sions of expenditure reduction. For each dimension, two orthog-
onal comparisons (one for each degree of freedom) can be
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TABLE 5
Orthogonal Comparisons of Mean Support for Tax
Reduction, by Party Preference
*p < .05
a. Scores have been rescaled so that the total sample weighted mean and variance
equal 0 and 1, respectively.
b. Adjusted and unadjusted collective good means are identical since income is not
correlated with this variable (see Table 4).
formulated to answer the question of who disagrees with whom.
This is accomplished by testing differences in mean levels of
support for tax reduction at the expense of each type of program
among meaningful combinations of Democrats, Republicans,
and Independents.9 These means are adjusted for income to
remove from the comparisons that variation in support for tax
reduction among party categories which actually is attributable
to differences in income among the party categories.
Results of the orthogonal comparisons are summarized in
Table 5. The mean levels of support for tax reduction at the
expense of each kind of program have been rescaled for the total
sample so that the mean and variance are 0.00 and 1.00, respec-
tively. The rescaled, adjusted means indicate that Republicans, as
a group, stand above the average for the entire sample in favoring
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restriction on social weltare expenditures in order to lower taxes
(.33) and below the sample average in willingness to cut back
collective good programs (-.21). Roughly the reverse is true of
Independents (-.22 and .34, respectively), while Democrats are
slightly below the sample means in their willingness to lower taxes
if less were spent for either of the two kinds of programs (-.09 and
-.01).
The orthogonal comparisons indicate that disagreements over
lowering taxes when the costs are specifically defined pit (1)
Republicans who wish to reduce social welfare spending against
Democrats and Independents and (2) Independents who are wil-
ling to reduce collective good expenditures against Democrats
and Republicans. The first comparison shows that Republicans,
on the average, are significantly more likely to sacrifice social
welfare programs than either Democrats or Independents (t =
4.45, p < .05). The latter two groups do not disagree substan-
tially over this issue (t = .97, p > .05). A &dquo;tax rebellion&dquo; contain-
ing only this type of cleavage basically would reflect ongoing
institutionalized conflict. However, disagreement over cutbacks
in collective good programs might qualify as a true social move-
ment since it pits established and unincorporated preference
structures against one another. While the collective goods issue
does not divide Democrats and Republicans (t = 1.75, p> .05),
Independents, unlike party identifiers, are willing to reduce these
expenditures in order to lower taxes (t = 3.46, p < .05).
DISCUSSION
The initial evidence presented here from the annual survey is
based on a sample drawn from a single metropolitan area. There-
fore, it cannot be legitimately generalized to the national scene in
any literal sense, and to do so was not our intention. Rather, ours
was the modest goal of drawing out the aspects of the tax rebel-
lion which might guide future research. We believe our study does
raise and investigate two aspects of the tax rebellion that merit the
scrutiny of social scientists in subsequent research. The first of
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these deals with the conditions giving rise to a tax rebellion, either
as a version of ongoing institutionalized conflict or as a true social
movement. The second concerns the roles of mainstream party
identifiers and of Independents in the tax revolt and politics in
general.
The first consideration addresses the problem of accounting
for the emergence of a tax rebellion of any kind. The traditional
answer in the social sciences to this sort of question employs a
social psychological explanation: persons become combatants in
such a &dquo;rebellion&dquo; because they are experiencing higher levels of
stress or deprivation than those who remain noncombatants
(Davies, 1962; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr, 1970). Our study fol-
lows this tradition with the prominence given here to our ques-
tions concerning the perceived tax burden. However, a more
recent trend in the social movements literature has been to focus
attention on structural and historical factors which define main-
tenance and survival requirements for social movements and their
organizations (Tilly, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). This
approach implies that levels of stress or strain always are suffi-
ciently high in a society to give rise to institutional or counterinsti-
tutional conflict. In this view, conflicts become political realities
when history and social structure, either by instigation or by
fortuitous circumstance, provide the conditions conducive for the
expression of discontent.
In this article, we have advanced and tested such a predisposing
factor: the free-rider principle. Our findings basically support
Buchanan’s (1979) argument concerning the critical role this
principle may play in mobilizing support for tax reduction. Only
so long as the costs of tax reduction are ill-defined will there
appear to be a homogeneous tax rebellion. The free-rider princi-
ple has created a temporary alliance of previously unallied groups
who, we suspect, are not likely to remain allies if tax reduction
begins to be followed by reductions in specific expenditures.
The second issue raised in this study concerns the cleavages we
detect between Democrats and Republicans on some tax reduc-
tion issues and between these mainstream identifiers and Indepen-
dents on other questions. The first cleavage, we believe, is nothing
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new in American politics. It represents a traditional split between
Democrats and Republicans over the issue of government spend-
ing in behalf of the poor.
However, the second cleavage may be the beginning of a true
social movement since it pits institutionalized against unincorpo-
rated preference structures. The question occurs: What is it about
Independents which makes them willing to sacrifice collective
goods, but not social welfare programs, in exchange for lower
taxes? We are not sure. Other literature contains evidence of
significant changes in the composition of those failing to claim
affiliation with either the Democrats or Republicans. Early stu-
dies of political behavior depicted Independents as less informed
about, and more withdrawn from, elections and politics in gen-
eral than those identifying with a major political party (Berelson
et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960). In addition, the recorded
proportion of self-proclaimed Independents was but a very small
fraction of the electorate. More recently, however, Pomper ( 1975)
and Ladd ( 1978b) report finding increases in the relative numbers
of Independents (to about 15% to 20% of the electorate). Further,
the &dquo;new&dquo; Independents are, on the average, younger, better
educated, and more politically informed than persons claiming a
preference for a major party.
All this may portend either a gradual (and successful) realign-
ment of party coalitions to encompass the Independents or else a
long-term social movement for which the tax question is but one
of many issues confronted by it. In any event, our data suggest
that future research on the tax revolt be linked with the growing
body of literature dealing with the &dquo;new Independent.&dquo;
NOTES
1. There is evidence that a sizable number of voters were convinced, largely because of
an accumulated $5 billion surplus in the state budget, that tax revenues could be reduced
without losing essential services. For instance, a comfortable plurality of persons polled
just days before the vote believed that Proposition 13, if implemented, would not impair
police or fire protection or hinder the operation of local school systems (Field, 1978: 5).
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2. Wilson and Banfield (1964) advanced the terms public- versus private-regarding-
ness to refer to values motivating voters to favor or disfavor proposals which are in the
public interest but incompatible with their own self-interests. These terms imply a subjec-
tive evaluation on the part of the individual voter of "who" benefits. We prefer to
categorize expenditures as "objectively" designated for specific groups or for the general
public. For a further critique of the public- versus private-regardingness hypothesis, see
Hahn’s ( 1970) study of referenda voting.
3. The very small number of missing data for the tax items were recoded to the
respective means. A regression equation using education and occupation as predictor
variables was employed to estimate income in the case of missing data for that variable.
Only one person failed to indicate a party preference. She or he was treated as an
Independent.
4. Of course, it is possible that people believe that taxes could be cut without any
accompanying reductions in expenditures. We have not addressed this issue in the present
study. Rather, we are concerned here with which costs people would be willing to incur if
tax reductions were accompanied by reduced government spending. We limit our dimen-
sions of the tax revolt to this condition.
5. Note that if respondents typically think of programs in terms of the level of
government which funds and administers them, three factors would emerge: federal
expenditures (welfare, public housing, national defense), state expenditures (highways/
streets, prisons), and local expenditures (police protection). This is not the case. In other
words, in the minds of respondents, the salient feature of the items was not the level of
government implied, but rather whether the expenditure was for social welfare programs
or collective goods. This seems to suggest that the public’s desire for tax reduction is not
aimed at a particular level of government. Instead, it is aimed at specific types of spending
which transcend levels of government.
6. Further evidence is provided by a tabular analysis we have performed. We dicho-
tomized the three social welfare items and the three collective good items and examined
the 2 x 2 tables formed by pairs of each kind of program. For the three pairs of items in the
social welfare dimension, the average percent of the sample who agree with both items in
the pair is 31.6%. For the three pairs of collective good items, the average is 10.8%. Hence,
about three times as many people in the sample favor restrictions in social welfare
spending as favor reductions in collective good programs.
7. Scales were created following Armor’s (1974) instructions for factor scaling and
computing theta reliability. Details are available from the authors upon request.
8 This covariance procedure assumes the absence of interaction effects, that is, that
the relationship between party preference and support for tax reduction is consistent
across all levels of income. We verified the assumption for our data by dummy coding
party preference variables for both additive and saturated models No significant interac-
tion effects were detected.
9. For a summary of the basic rules to be followed in making orthogonal comparisons,
see Kirk (1968: 73-78).
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